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Abstract
We identify the benets and costs of nancial openness in terms of currency
crises based on a novel quantication of the systemic impact of currency (nancial)
crises. We nd that systemic currency crises mainly exist regionally, and that nan-
cial openness helps diminish the probability of a currency crisis after controlling for
their systemic impact. To clarify further the e¤ect of nancial openness, we decom-
pose it into the various types of capital inows. We nd that the reduction of the
probability of a currency crisis depends on the type of capital and on the region.
Finally yet importantly, we nd that monetary policy geared towards price stability,
through a exible ination target that takes into account systemic impact, reduces
the probability of a currency crisis.
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1 Introduction
The wave of capital ows running through many emerging market economies up to the
beginning of the "great contraction" brought renewed attention on how macroeconomic
policies should respond to these ows, especially in light of current account balance posi-
tions and the high degree of reserves accumulation. Prior to the current downturn, these
capital ows were associated with ample global liquidity and favorable worldwide economic
conditions; and in many cases they were a reection of strengthened macroeconomic policy
frameworks and growth-enhancing structural reforms. Economists have also argued that
increased openness to capital ows has, in general, proven vital for countries aiming to
leapfrog from lower- to middle-income status (e.g. Fischer, 1998; Summers, 2000).
However, signicant concerns about the stability of national and international nan-
cial systems, stemming from the crises that occurred since the 1990s, have been voiced
throughout the last few years. Some economists view increasing nancial openness and
unregulated capital ows as a grave obstruction to global nancial stability (see for exam-
ple Bhagwati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz, 2000, 2003; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2008).
Moreover, because capital inows have the potential to generate overheating, and a loss of
competitiveness, there have been calls for a reconsideration of the use of capital controls
on international asset trade (see for example Ostry et al., 2010). Therefore, the fear has
re-emerged that in an environment of relatively free international capital markets nancial
crises are becoming more frequent, and that such developments may easily spill over to
other economies.1
In response to these events, several di¤erent theoretical models were developed showing
how crises end up spreading across countries. For example, some of the major models of
systemic crises are based on trade linkages and macroeconomic similarities (Gerlach and
Smets, 1995; Eichengreen et al., 1996; Glick and Rose, 1999; van Rijckeghem and Weber,
2001), while other models are based on nancial linkages, neighborhood e¤ects, and ex-
ogenous shifts in investorsbeliefs (Masson, 1999; Calvo and Mendoza, 2000; Kaminsky
and Reinhart, 2000; Kodres and Pritsker, 2002). In rst-generation interpretations of
currency crises, the vitality (or lack thereof) of a xed exchange rate is established by
external fundamentals unconnected to how economic agents behave (see Salant and Hen-
derson, 1978; Krugman, 1979; Flood and Garber, 1984). In these models, economic agents
base their beliefs on the assumption that scal imbalances and/or domestic credit policies
1Interestingly, there is little empirical evidence supporting the view that nancial openness by itself
increases vulnerability to crises.
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will not be a¤ected by their actions. By contrast, "second-generation" models of crises
are based on the interface between expectations and actual outcomes, in which market
expectations solidly inuence macroeconomic policy, leading to self-fullling crises (see
Obstfeld, 1986, 1994). Given this explanation, market sentiment plays an important role
in the determination of a crisis, especially when it comes in the form of unexpected changes
in expectations.
Therefore, when speculators expect the occurrence of a crisis across countries, they
have an incentive to engage in nancial market transactions that create links between
otherwise separatemarkets; Kodres and Pritsker (2002) have called this process "cross-
market rebalancing". That is, if speculators expect that a crisis in country i will be
immediately followed by a crisis in country j, they have an incentive to be active in both
(currency) markets in order to "benet" from this joint correlation. When a crisis occurs
in country i, it will change the wealth levels of speculators and, therefore, change their
actions in country js currency market in a way that increases the probability of a crisis
in the latter. The belief that joint crises will occur is "self-fullling": if investors expect
there to be no correlation between the outcomes of the two markets, they will have no
incentive to rebalance their portfolios, and joint crises will not occur. This view is a
simple theory of systemic risk in which a devaluation of one currency acts as a signal
that coordinates expectations on the crisis equilibrium in another currency market.2 The
immediate source of joint crises equilibrium in this simple setting is the fact that the same
investors can be active in both markets, which generates a wealth channel through which
crises are transmitted (see Aghion et al. 2001; Kodres and Pritsker 2002). Since we know
that exchange rates (and other asset prices) are less predictable than they are in models
with a unique outcome, as a result, second generation models are deemed to "square
better with the stylized facts of global nancial markets" (Masson, 1999). Furthermore,
and as discussed by Pesenti and Tille (2000), the main advantage of resorting to such an
interpretation of currency crises is the ability to di¤erentiate between two types of volatility,
"one related to nancial markets and one related to macroeconomic fundamentals".
As the foregoing discussion points out, the intensity and time-clustering of nancial
crises has now forced both policy makers and academics to focus on "systemic risk" as a
principal culprit; especially given that a full joint crisis in the nancial system can have
strong adverse consequences for the real economy and general economic welfare. More-
2If two countries are highly integrated (e.g. through trade), then it is not entirely surprising that a
crisis in one would have strong e¤ects on the other. The importance of expectations is most often stressed
in cases where the two currencies are, at least in principle, not closely related.
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over, because no open economy can fully insulate itself from its surrounding environment,
economies may need to adopt, either regionally and/or globally, coordinated measures in
order to prevent "systemic risks" (which thus far has proved di¢ cult to quantify). However,
despite the plethora of currency crises models, consensus does not exist with respect to the
relevant channels and the implications for policy. For example, if the trade channel is rel-
evant then countries may need to diversify their trade portfolio, and/or x their exchange
rates (collectively) in order to avoid speculative attacks following the loss of international
competitiveness. If, on the other hand, the "nancial openness" channel is relevant, then
countries may need to impose capital controls on capital ows.3
In this paper we study the e¤ects of nancial openness and its decomposition on the
probability of a currency crisis. To address this issue, the paper follows a three-step ap-
proach and answers three interrelated questions: (i) How can we best capture the systemic
impact of crises? (ii) Is the systemic impact (risk) of currency crises a regional or a global
phenomenon? (iii) By controlling for the systemic impact of currency crises, does nan-
cial openness and its decomposition into the various types of capital inows, increase or
decrease the probability of a currency crisis?
Methodologically, we start by using extreme value theory (EVT) to identify the linkage
between currency crises; this statistical technique is well suited to address the extreme
co-movements of nancial markets. In an univariate setting, this approach has been used
to study the frequency of currency market (Koedijk et al., 1990; Hols and de Vries, 1991),
stock market (Jansen and de Vries, 1991; Longin, 1996) and bond market (Hartman et al.,
2004) crashes in industrial countries. Therefore, the research herein di¤ers and contributes
to the literature in at least three ways. By focusing on 23 economies from Africa, Asia, and
the Western Hemisphere, we extend the analysis of extreme exchange rate uctuations to
a bivariate setting by taking into account the extreme co-movements of asset prices. We
do this by measuring the joint occurrence of currency market crashes through our newly
created conditional probability of joint failure (CPJF). Secondly, we propose a new and re-
vised version of the "crises elsewhere" or "neighborhood" variable that is often constructed
in the contagion literature. By construction, the standard "neighborhood" variable only
considers whether one of the neighboring countries is su¤ering a crisis; however, this gives
the same weight and importance to the crisis in (all) other economies. This is counter-
factual given that economies experience di¤erent links during crises periods. Accordingly,
our second step is to incorporate the di¤erent levels of connections between economies
3The literature always discusses "capital ows" in general. In our opinion, this is quite misleading since
not all capital is created equal (see also Garita, 2008).
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by using the CPJF to weight our crises indicators; this yields a new measure of systemic
impact vis-à-vis nancial crises. In this manner, we weight down those economies that
are less connected, while giving a higher weight to those economies that are more highly
interconnected. Thirdly, by using an expanded data set representing di¤erent regions of
the world we test, through a panel probit model as in Eichengreen et al. (1996), the impact
of nancial openness and its decomposition into di¤erent types of capital inows on the
probability of a currency crisis. We also allow the systemic impact of currency crises to
operate through the "cross-market rebalancing" channel.
Overall, our results indicate that currency crises are linked, but mainly within regions.
The probit results reveal that higher levels of de facto nancial openness lowers the prob-
ability of a currency crisis, after controlling for the systemic impact of currency crises.
When we decompose nancial openness into its various types of capital inows, we nd
that African and Western Hemisphere economies benet from "persistent" FDI inows;
while Asia is the only region that benets from a steady increase in portfolio-type inows
(i.e. by seeking and developing their bond markets). We also nd that monetary policy
geared towards price stability, through a exible ination target that takes into account
systemic risk, reduces the probability of a currency crisis.
The remainder of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodol-
ogy and data sources. Section 3 discusses the tail dependence and/or independence of
the economies in our sample vis-à-vis currency crises. Section 4 provides analysis of the
empirical ndings, while section 5 performs an out-of-sample investigation. Section 6 is
entirely devoted to the discussion of our robustness checks. Last but not least, section 7
concludes.
2 Methodology and Data
In this section we introduce our data and the procedure for constructing an exchange
market pressure (EMP) index. We then use EVT to specify the crisis variables for each
country. Thirdly, we present our general methodology for analyzing the e¤ect of di¤erent
sources on currency crises. Finally, we introduce our newly created "systemic impact"
variable, which incorporates information on the di¤erent crises linkages.
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2.1 Exchange Market Pressure Index
Following Girton and Roper (1977) and Eichengreen et al. (1996), we construct an ex-
change market pressure index as a weighted average of (nominal) exchange rate changes,
international reserve changes, and interest rate changes, to measure speculative pressure
on a country and its currency. A common feature of studies that try to comprehend the
fundamental determinants of currency crises is the construction of a single composite index
that will systematically identify the presence and harshness of currency crises or specula-
tive attacks on a currency. In this light, studies such as Eichengreen et al. (1995, 1996),
Sachs et al. (1996), and Kaminsky et al. (1998), have proposed di¤erent approaches to the
construction of an exchange market pressure (EMP) index. The EMP is a good index of
currency crises as it reects di¤erent manifestations of speculative attacks, be they suc-
cessful or not. The argument is that the central bank of a country may allow the currency
to depreciate in response to intense speculative attack against its currency. In some other
cases, the central bank may defend the currency by running down its foreign exchange
reserves or by raising interest rates. Therefore, our exchange market pressure for country
i at time t is computed as follows:
EMPit =
1
e
eit
eit
  1
r

rmit
rmit
  rmus;t
rmus;t

+
1
it
( (iit   ius;t)) (1)
where eit are the units of country is currency per U.S. dollar in period t; e is the standard
deviation of the relative change in the exchange rate (eit
eit
); rmit is the ratio of gross foreign
reserves to money stock or monetary base for country i in period t; r is the standard
deviation of the di¤erence between the relative changes in the ratio of foreign reserves and
money (money base) in country i and the USA

rmit
rmit
  rmus;t
rmus;t

; iit is the nominal interest
rate for country i in period t; ius;t is the nominal interest rate for the USA in period t;
it is the standard deviation of the nominal interest rate di¤erential ( (iit   ius;t)).4 We
construct the data set ranging from 1978  2007.
By denition, a currency crisis occurs when the realized exchange market pressure is
unusually large. The main problem with this terminology is in dening the threshold
that determines the largeness of the index, and therefore, the approach used varies from
study to study. In the literature, this has usually done by assuming a normal distribution
of the EMP. More specically, the customary manner of choice for the statistical threshold
4In theory, for a pure oat, the change in the exchange rate would correspond exactly to the index of
exchange market pressure. At the other extreme, for a peg, the exchange rate would be constant, and
uctuations in the EMP would be driven entirely by changes in reserves and/or interest rates.
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previously mentioned has involved arbitrary multiples of the standard deviation of the
EMP above its mean (i.e. 1.5, 2, or 3 standard deviations are commonly used). There are
at least two criticism on such a procedure. First of all, it relies on the EMP index being
normally distributed. Secondly, by considering the EMP as a normally distributed variable,
the threshold is arbitrarily chosen. Therefore, the conventional method of dening currency
crises is statistically awed and/or inaccurate in capturing the true dispersion of any
given EMP series. In other words, the conventional method of employing the mean and
standard deviation will, more often than not, underestimate the frequency of speculative
attacks.
In fact, the threshold chosen in the literature simply corresponds to a quantile at a
"certain" probability level.5 In order to dene a crisis, we also use a quantile of the
EMP series as our threshold choice, but without a priori specifying the distribution of the
EMP. We determine the level of the tail probability that corresponds to the threshold by
using extreme value theory. Extreme value theory analyzes the tail behavior of extreme
observations by assuming that the extreme observations can be approximated by a Pareto
distribution. By plotting the estimates of the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution
against the number of high order statistics k used in estimation, the proper threshold6 can
be chosen from the rst stable region in the plot (see Hill, 1975); such a procedure has
been employed by, for example, de Haan and de Ronde (1998). In this paper we follow the
same methodology, and nd that for all countries in our sample, k  45. Since we have 337
observations for each country, this yields a quantile with probability level 45=337 = 13:3%.
Formally, for country i at time t let us denote the EMP series as EMPit. Then we take
its V aR at probability level 13:3% denoted by V aRi as the suitable threshold for dening
a tail event in country i. We then construct a dichotomous tail event variable for country
i at time t as
Crisisit = 1 if EMPit  V aRi (2)
= 0 otherwise:
Here we use the notation "crisis"; however, the indicator is in fact measuring a tail event.
As we will discuss later, within the extreme value theory setup, the linkages between crises
5In nance, the high quantile is the Value-at-Risk (VaR). That is, for a risk factor X, its VaR at a
given level p is dened as V aR(p), which satises P (X > V aR(p)) = p. Therefore, by assuming normality,
the mean plus 1:5 standard deviation threshold corresponds to a VaR at probability level 6:7%.
6Given the selfsimilarity of the Pareto distribution, tail properties above such a threshold can be
extrapolated to the situaion when an even higher threshold is imposed.
7
can be extrapolated from the linkages between tail events. Thus, in the empirical sections,
we will use the indicators of tail events for evaluating the linkages and extrapolate these
tail events to the linkage between crises.
2.2 Econometric Approach
In this subsection we lay out the specics of our econometric model used to test whether the
probability of a crisis in an individual economy is a¤ected by events occurring elsewhere.
According to a number of theoretical models mentioned in the introduction, currency crises
may occur simultaneously among economies that have a trade channel, that have similar
macroeconomic fundamentals, that are more nancially integrated into the world capital
markets, and/or that are neighbors. Therefore, following Eichengreen et al. (1996) we
estimate a panel probit model using monthly data for 23 economies from around the world
(see Appendices A and B for the list of sample countries, data descriptions, and descriptive
statistics) as follows:
Crisisit = Dit(Crisis) + I(L)it + "it (3)
where
Dit(Crisis) = 1 if Crisisjt = 1 for any j 6= i and j & i 2 (same region)
= 0 otherwise
In this model, D(Crisis) is the "traditional" crisis elsewhere variable, which gives
the same importance to other economies in the same region. The vector I(L)it is an
information set of macroeconomic control variables (see appendix A for a full description),
which includes the growth rate of money (M2) as a percentage of international reserves,
CPI ination, domestic credit as a percentage of GDP, the growth rate of real GDP, the
percentage of government budget (net) balance relative to GDP, and the percentage of
the current account relative to GDP.7 We also include variables that capture the di¤erent
channels by which crises may take place (or can be exacerbated). For instance, we include
several de facto measures, such as trade openness, nancial integration,8 FDI inows,
7Each variable enters as deviation from the corresponding variable of the center country, which in our
case it is the United States.
8Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports over GDP; we use nancial integration following
the nomenclature used by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) and Kose et al. (2006), which is the sum of
nancial assets and liabilities divided by GDP.
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portfolio inows and debt inows, in order to provide a better picture of the extent of a
countrys integration into global (nancial) markets. Last but not least, we also augment
our model by including a dummy variable capturing the onset of a banking crisis9 in order
to capture the link between banking and currency crises, as documented by Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999) and Glick and Hutchinson (2001).
The control variables are in line with the arguments of the rst generation models of
speculative attacks, which was rst brought to light by Krugman (1979) and was later
modied by Flood and Garber (1984). A number of papers have extended the Krugman-
Flood-Garber model in other directions (see for example Agénor et al., 1992). Edwards
(2005) looks at this issue using a more sophisticatedmeasure of de jure nancial openness
that attempts to capture the intensity of capital controls. He looks at two manifestations
of external crises; sudden stops of capital inows, and current account reversals. He nds
no systematic evidence that countries with higher capital mobility tend to have a higher
incidence of crises, or tend to face a higher probability of having a crisis, than countries
with lower mobility. In subsequent work, Edwards (2006) concludes that there is no evi-
dence that the output costs of currency crises are smaller in countries that restrict capital
mobility. In sum, there is little formal empirical evidence to support the often-cited claim
that nancial globalization (in and of itself) is responsible for the epidemic of nancial
crises that the world has seen in recent history.
2.3 Weighting Tail Events
As has been previously mentioned, the "crises elsewhere" variable constructed in the lit-
erature only considers whether at least one of the other countries in the same region is
su¤ering a crisis. Hence, this procedure gives the same weight (i.e. the same importance)
to crises in (all) other economies. Intuitively, however, countries may have di¤erent links
during crises, or non-normal, periods. Therefore, in order to incorporate the di¤erent levels
of connections between economies, we need, as a rst measure, the dependence of the tail
events of the EMPs between the di¤erent economies.
The traditional method employed to study interdependencies between di¤erent ran-
dom events is the (pearson) correlation coe¢ cient, since correlations characterize general
interdependencies. However, there are two drawbacks to this measure for the purposes of
this paper10. First, the correlation coe¢ cient measures dependence during normal times
9Dates for the onset of banking crisis were taken from Laeven and Valencia (2008).
10A classic reference is Forbes and Rigobon (2002), who show that by adjusting for heteroskedastic
biases, "there was virtually no increase in unconditional correlation coe¢ cients".
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(i.e. given "moderate levels"), and it is largely dominated by the moderate observations
rather than the extreme observations. Second, the denition of the correlation coe¢ cient
depends on the assumption of nite variance; however, the distribution of asset returns
(e.g. exchange rates) may be heavy-tailed. Therefore, given that the exchange rate is a
component of the EMP, then the EMP may inherit this heavy-tail feature. In our case,
the variance of the EMP index can be innite since we cannot rule out the possibility that
the tail index may be below 2; therefore, what we require is a measure of tail dependence
(see Embrechts et al., 2000; Hartman et al., 2004). We dene the "conditional probability
of joint failure" (CPJF) as follows11: given that at least one of two economies is in a crisis,
the CPJF is dened as the conditional probability that the other country is also in a crisis.
That is, suppose that EMPi and EMPj are the EMPs of countries i and j, then the
corresponding V aR (value at risk) at probability level p of these two variables are V aRi(p)
and V aRj(p). We then dene:
CPJF i;j= lim
p!0
P (EMP i> V aRi(p) and EMP j> V aRj(p)jEMP i> V aRi(p) or EMP j> V aRj(p))
(4)
which can be rewritten as
CPJFij = E[j  1]  1 (5)
where
E[j  1] = lim
p!0
P (EMPi > V aRi(p)) + P (EMPj > V aRj(p))
1  P (EMPi  V aRi(p); EMPj  V aRj(p)) (6)
is the dependence measure introduced by Embrechts et al. (2000), and rst applied by
Hartman et al. (2004). Notice that under the multivariate extreme value analysis frame-
work, the limit in (4) and (6) exists (see de Haan and Ferreira, 2006, Ch. 7). Therefore, as
soon as p is at a "low level" the conditional probability is already close to its asymptotic
value, even for a nite level of p.12 In other words, the CPJF will be stable when comparing
the linkage between crises and tail events. In order to estimate the CPJFi;j, we use the
following estimator (see de Haan and Ferreira, 2006, Ch. 7):
\CPJF i;j =
P
tCrisisitCrisisjtP
tCrisisit +
P
tCrisisjt  
P
tCrisisitCrisisjt
(7)
11This measure is reminiscent of the correlation coe¢ cient, in the sense that the asymptotic independence
case corresponds to 0, while full dependence corresponds to 1.
12Therefore, the choice of p for dening a crisis is insensitive when it is at a "low level".
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A higher CPJF between two economies indicates that nancial crises in these two
countries are more likely to occur at the same time. Moreover, the CPJFs between one
economy (e.g. A) and other economies (e.g. B, C, D) in the same region may vary,
which underscores the di¤erent linkages during crisis periods, as previously mentioned.
Therefore, when constructing a systemic impact variable that accounts for the impact of
crises in a region, it is necessary to use the CPJFs between economies as weights. In this
manner those economies that are less connected are weighted down, while giving a higher
weight to those economies that are more interconnected. This accords with the "cross-
market rebalancing" e¤ect as derived by Kodres and Pritsker (2002). Therefore, our newly
constructed "systemic impact" variable is given as:
Wit(Crisis) =
X
j 6=i
CPJFijCrisisjt: (8)
By employing our new systemic impact variable, we will re-test our probit model as follows:
Crisisit = Wit(Crisis) + I(L)it + "it: (9)
3 Tail Dependence or Independence?
As shown in section 2.3, we measure systemic risk in a bivariate setting through the
conditional probability of joint failure (CPJF). The CPJF always lies between 0 and 1.
If it equals zero, then the probability of a joint tail event is negligible; however, if equals
one, then a tail event in one economy will always go hand in hand with the "downfall"
of the other economy. Our rst step is to test H0 : CPJF = 0 from the asymptotic
distribution of the CPJF estimator (for details of this test, see de Haan and Ferreira,
2006). The results are shown in Appendix C (Tables 13, 15, and 17), and are discussed in
the following subsections.
3.1 Asia
Table 12 shows the regular dependence among Asian countries through their correlation
coe¢ cient.13 For example, Pakistan, in general, can be considered as independent from
the other countries, while Thailand can only also be considered independent from all other
countries, except with Malaysia. Some other bilateral relationships worth highlighting are:
13Although a few negative numbers appear, they are not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
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Singapore-Malaysia ( = 0:51), Australia-Japan ( = 0:40) and Korea-Japan ( = 0:37).
Compared to Table 12, Table 13 shows quite some di¤erent results for tail-dependence.
For example, the aforementioned relationship between Australia and Japan now exhibits
a much lower (non-signicant) dependence level (CPJF = 0:15), indicating that these
countries tend to be independent during crisis periods. As far as Singapore-Malaysia, and
Korea-Japan, we can once again see a strong (highly signicant) link during crisis periods
(CPJF = 0:27, CPJF = 0:22, respectively). Moreover, Thailand-India are actually more
dependent during crisis periods (CPJF = 0:27) than a standard correlation analysis would
indicate. The above comparison shows that regular-dependence and tail-dependence are
independent. Therefore, if we solely relied on the standard correlation coe¢ cient, we would
tend to misjudge the dependency during crisis periods in Asian economies.
3.2 Western Hemisphere
The regular dependence measure among western hemisphere economies, shown in Table 14,
indicates low dependence. The only exceptions are Argentina-Brazil ( = 0:40), followed
by Argentina-Mexico ( = 0:18). Table 15 exhibits the tail dependence in the Western
Hemisphere region. Compared to the Asia results, tail dependence is weaker in "the west",
as none of the CPJFs are signicantly di¤erent from zero. Therefore, we can only conclude
that economies in this region are independent from one another during crises.
3.3 Africa
Table 16 shows a very high regular dependence among African economies, while Table 17
continues to display extremely high CPJFs. For example, Burkina Faso, Côte dIvoire,
Mauritius and Mali are highly dependent. Niger and Senegal show the highest tail de-
pendence in this region (CPJF = 0:91). It is also worth pointing out that South Africa
is in general independent from the other African economies in our sample during crises
periods. Given the above observations, we can categorize the African economies into three
groups: group 1: Burkina Faso, Côte dIvoire, Mauritius and Mali; group 2: Niger and
Senegal; group 3: South Africa. This classication shows that dependence during a crisis is
(in general) observed within groups; however, these groups can be considered independent
from each other.
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3.4 Global (in)dependence
One of the claims that is most often voiced in the literature and in the media is that
systemic currency crises can spread across regions. However, as can be discerned from
Tables 18-20, the tail dependence across the three regions is low. Therefore, we can only
conclude that extreme exchange market pressure, in and of itself, is not very likely to
spread from region to region. That is, currency crises are regional.
Thus far, we have identied the tail dependence (independence) among currency crises,
at both the regional and global level based on the CPJF. Accordingly, the results in the
previous section provide an overview of the potential systemic impact of currency crises
stemming from regional neighbors. In the next section, we go a few steps further, by
controlling for systemic impact. This allows us to investigate the pros and cons of nancial
openness, among other economic policies.
4 Probit Estimation Results
4.1 Asia Sample
We begin this section by discussing the traditional "crises elsewhere" variable approach
often used in the literature (see Table 1), then we will compare and contrast these results
to our new approach based on the "systemic impact" variable (see Table 2). Since pro-
bit coe¢ cients are not easily interpretable we also include the e¤ects of a one standard
deviation percentage change in the regressors on the probability of a crisis (mfx).
The results found in Table 1 indicate that a speculative attack elsewhere in Asia in-
creases the probability of a domestic currency crisis by around 9 percentage points (as
captured by the "traditional" neighborhood dummy often used as a starting point in the
literature). When we look at nancial integration (column 1:2) and at trade openness
(column 1:3), we do not nd any particular e¤ect vis-à-vis currency crises. Another way
to look at de facto nancial openness is to discriminate between capital ows (i.e. between
FDI, portfolio and debt), as we do in column 1:5 of Table 1. These results show that
higher (and sustained) levels of FDI and portfolio-type inows are associated with a lower
probability of a crisis (FDI inows lower the probability of a currency crisis by 3:1%, while
portfolio inows lower it by 1:6% given a one standard deviation shock). On the other
hand, debt inows increase the probability of a currency crisis by 0:3% for a standard
deviation shock. Table 1 also gives some support to the predictions of the rst generation
models of speculative attacks; that is, the probability of a currency crisis rises with higher
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levels of CPI ination and the government budget decit as a percentage of GDP (both
signicant at the 1%), all measured relative to the USA. This latter result shows that coun-
tercyclical scal policy in the form of slower growth in government expenditure is strongly
associated with lower exchange market pressure. Moreover, as GDP growth increases, the
odds of a speculative attack increase by 1%, which hints at the fact that Asian economies,
which have enjoyed tremendous and steady growth in GDP should be careful of the upside
risk (e.g. overheating). Additionally, the onset of a banking crisis is signicantly correlated
with a currency crisis in Asia; however, this link disappears when we include the various
types of capital ows (see specication 1:5).
After employing the "traditional crises elsewhere" variable, we replace it by our newly
constructed "systemic impact" variable. As discussed in Section 2:3, our CPJF weight
captures the di¤erent links between crises of the underlying economy and its neighbors.
Therefore, we argue that it also captures the expectations that investors form regarding
the value of their assets, given that there is a crisis elsewhere in their (investment) region.
In this view, the combination of our CPJF with the tail event indicators, which yields our
"systemic impact" variable, summarizes the macroeconomic risk factor structure of asset
values. According to the "cross-market rebalancing" argument, when speculators expect
the occurrence of a crisis across countries, they have an incentive to engage in nancial
market transactions that create links between otherwise separatemarkets.
Table 2 shows the results of substituting the traditional "neighborhood" dummy vari-
able with our systemic impact variable. While most results remain similar to those pre-
sented in Table 1, we focus on comparing and contrasting the di¤erences between the two
tables. As a rst step, it is important to point out that by using our systemic impact
variable, we improve the t of the equations; moreover, our systemic impact variable en-
ters quite strongly and highly signicantly. The positive sign of the coe¢ cient on this
new variable indicates that the probability that the domestic economy will experience a
currency crisis increases by around 6% for a one standard deviation increase in systemic
risk14. This shows that when market participants are hit by an idiosyncratic shock in an
Asian economy, they transmit the shock abroad by "optimally" rebalancing their portfo-
lios exposure to macroeconomic risks through other countriesmarkets, which is in line
with the cross-market rebalancing e¤ect.
14It is important to keep in mind that our new variable is continuous, and that we have applied a one
standard deviation shock. If we evaluate this variable at the mean, then the marginal e¤ect is about 24%
for an increase in systemic risk.
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Specication 2:2 indicates that more nancial integration (as proxied by the sum of
nancial assets and liabilities over GDP) is benecial for Asian economies as far as reducing
the probability of a currency crisis. Interestingly, Glick et al. (2006) also found that
capital account openness reduces the probability of currency crises, even after controlling
for selection bias in terms of how macroeconomic policies inuence the existence of capital
controls. Turning to the di¤erent types of capital ows, specication 2:5 indicates that debt
and FDI inows do not have any e¤ect vis-à-vis the probability of a currency crisis. This
latter result for FDI is not surprising given that this type of investment is more stable and
persistent (see Sarno and Taylor, 1999), and therefore "less risky". At the very least these
results suggest that longer-term capital inows do not seem to have insidious side e¤ects
for Asian economies15. However, portfolio-type inows do help reduce the probability of
a currency crisis. This result indicates that economies in Asia must develop their bond
markets, since local bond issues assist in the reduction of currency and maturity mismatches
on balance sheets. Notwithstanding the benets linked to the provision of another source of
funding, a rushed enlargement of bond markets could be potentially risky. In this respect,
our result that portfolio inows reduce the probability of a currency crisis makes perfect
sense, especially when we control for systemic impact. That is, the development of these
markets without minimal institutional support to deal with asymmetric information and
other capital market deciencies could cause havoc on the market, thereby slowing the
expansion of such markets over the medium term. The policy response for Asia is clear.
In order to rebalance their economies and reduce the probability of a currency crisis, these
economies need to encourage FDI and the development of bond markets; however, they
should keep a very close watch on short-term capital (debt) inows.
Table 2 also shows that the current account (specication 2:4) enters with the expected
sign even after controlling for "systemic impact"; that is, an increase in the current account
decit (i.e. lower reserves) increases the probability of a currency crisis by 2:1%. It is worth
mentioning that previous studies have been unsuccessful in linking current account decits
to currency crisis (see for example Eichengreen et al., 1996). When it comes to GDP
growth, Table 2 now shows that this variable does not enter signicantly. We also control
for the onset of a banking crisis, where it is important to note that, once we control for
systemic risk, the onset of a banking crisis is now no longer signicantly correlated with
a currency crisis in Asia. We argue that this arises from the reduction of information
asymmetry as provided by our new variable; thereby breaking the link between "the twin
crises".
15Garita (2008) shows that FDI inows are benecial through improvements in TFP growth.
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4.2 Western Hemisphere Results
The unweighted results for the Western Hemisphere (see Table 21 in appendix D)16 show
that a speculative attack elsewhere in this region is associated with an increased probability
of a domestic currency crisis of around 5 percentage points, as measured by the "regular"
neighborhood dummy variable. When we substitute the regular "neighborhood" variable
with our new "systemic impact" variable, the results remain relatively similar to Table
21; however, when the systemic impact variable is shocked by a standard deviation, the
probability that a western hemisphere economy will experience a currency crisis increases
by around 3:7% (the e¤ect is much larger if we evaluate this variable at the mean). At rst
glance, this result seems to contradict our "tail-independence" conclusion of section 3:2;
however, the results in section 3:2 are pairwise, while the regression results presented in
this section takes into account the systemic impact within the entire Western Hemisphere
region.
As far as nancial integration (see Table 3, column 3:2), we nd that the marginal e¤ect
on the probability of a currency crisis is negative, implying a decrease of almost 2% after
controlling for systemic impact. When we discriminate between capital ows, the results
found in column 3:5 show that higher (and sustained) levels of FDI inows are associated
with a decrease in the probability of a currency crisis of 7% (given a one standard deviation
shock), while portfolio and debt inows have no e¤ect. Moreover, according to Table 3,
the probability of a currency crisis increases by 4:8% on average with a standard deviation
increase in CPI ination, while the probability of a currency crisis increases by 2:5% for
the same shock to the M2-to-international-reserves ratio (i.e. liquidity). Since this latter
ratio captures the extent to which the liabilities of the banking system are backed by
international reserves; individuals will start rushing to convert their domestic currency
deposits into foreign currency in the event of a currency crisis. Therefore, this latter result
shows that a higher ability of a central bank to withstand this demand pressure reduces
the probability of a crisis. Furthermore, this e¤ect can be associated with greater exchange
market pressure because higher returns on domestic assets end up attracting more capital
inows and fueling upward pressures on the currency.
One major di¤erence between Asian and Western Hemisphere economies is that the
latter have had a more di¢ cult time in sustaining GDP growth. Accordingly, our results
show that Western Hemisphere economies need to grow in a more steady and sustained
fashion in order to decrease the probability of a currency crisis; a one standard deviation
16When we exclude Canada from the sample the results do not change.
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increase in GDP growth will decrease the probability of a crisis by 2% on average for
these economies. Additionally, specication 3:3 shows that the current account balance
exerts a negative e¤ect on the probability of a currency crisis for these economies. We also
nd, similarly to Glick and Hutchinson (2001), that currency crises tend to follow banking
crises but, in our case, only for the western hemisphere economies. That is, if an economy
in this region experiences a banking crisis, then the probability that this same economy
will experience a currency crisis increases by 13% on average, even after controlling for
"systemic impact".
4.3 Africa Results
For African economies, the unweighted results in Tables 22 (see Appendix D) show that
a speculative attack elsewhere in the African region is associated with an increased prob-
ability of a domestic currency crisis of around 20 percentage points, as measured by the
regular "neighborhood" variable. Turning to our systemic impact variable (see Table 4),
we see that it improves the t of the equations for African economies, and it also shows a
strong e¤ect vis-à-vis currency crises. Since African economies are highly tail dependent,
the occurrence of joint crises is very likely in this region. This indicates that when market
participants in this region experience an idiosyncratic shock in one economy, they transmit
the shock abroad by "optimally" rebalancing their portfoliosexposure to macroeconomic
risks through other countriesmarkets.
Interestingly, when taking our systemic impact variable into account, nancial integra-
tion now becomes insignicant (see specications 4:2). However, trade openness does enter
signicantly and with the expected sign, implying that a standard deviation increase in
trade openness will reduce the probability of a currency crisis by 3:6% on average. For
the di¤erent types of capital ows, only FDI inows are associated with a reduction in the
likelihood of a speculative attack by about 3% (see column 4:5), while portfolio inows
increase the probability of a currency crisis by 1:4% for a standard deviation shock.
Table 4 also shows that the probability of a currency crisis increases with an increase
in CPI ination and a higher M2-to-international reserves ratio. That is, for African
economies, higher levels of "domestic credit" increase the probability of a currency crisis.
This latter result once again corroborates the argument of "rst generation" models that
the defense of the exchange rate in a country with expansionary monetary policy and a
xed-exchange rate will cause domestic credit to expand, which will tend to surpass the
growth in demand for the domestic currency. Therefore, economic agents who are accruing
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excess liquidity have a preference to swap domestic currency for foreign-denominated se-
curities or domestic interest-bearing assets; both settings lead to a drop in value of the
domestic currency. In the former case, increased demand for foreign securities leads to
pressure"; while in the latter, market participants will sell domestic securities due to in-
creases in domestic bond prices, and will buy higher yielding foreign assets due to falling
domestic yields. The domestic central bank must accommodate to the increased demand
for foreign currency by reducing its foreign reserves since it is committed to keeping the
exchange rate xed. In sum, the loss of reserves for African economies stems from the
process of domestic credit expansion. As far as the link between the onset of a banking
crisis and currency crisis, we do not nd any association between, even after controlling
for systemic impact. The intuition for this result follows the reasoning as given for the
Asian economies in section 4:1. Combining this result with the non-signicance of nancial
integration indicates that the strong systemic impact underlying African economies is the
main source of currency crises. In other words, it is not necessarily the integration into
nancial markets that can cause a problem; rather it is information asymmetry that can
create and exacerbate the problem.
5 Out-of-Sample Analysis
As we have previously explained, our systemic impact variable was constructed based on
the conditional probability of joint failures (CPJF), which stems from the same dataset
used in the probit regressions, potentially leading to endogeneity. However, we argue that
the CPJF matrix, which identies the tail linkages across countries in the same region,
does not change dramatically between periods. Nonetheless, in order to check for any
potential endogeneity, we now construct our systemic impact variable at time t by using
data in [t  240; t  1] to re-estimate the CPJFs.
As was discussed in section 2, when constructing the CPJF it is necessary to specify
the number of high order statistics k (recall from Section 2 that we choose k = 45 when
using the entire sample of 337 months). By using an identical procedure as in section 2,
we nd that k = 40 in the out-of-sample case.17 We then compare the real data at time t
with the thresholds and identify which countries experience a tail event; this leads to the
variables Crisisit. The next step is to use equation (6) to calculate our systemic impact
variable, which is now entirely constructed from past information, thereby eliminating any
17It is quite remarkable that the corresponding probability level is 40=240 = 16:7%, which is quite close
to the one used for the entire sample 13:3%. The Hill plots for these new results are available upon request.
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potential endogeneity in our probit model. We distinguish between the approach in this
out-of-sample section and the entire sample approach of section 4, by referring to them
as the out-of-sample and the in-sample approach, respectively. Before proceeding
with the results, we must mention that the onset of a banking crisis variable could not be
included in this out-of-sample analysis due to collinearity with the constant, since during
this new sampling period there are no onsets of banking crisis.
For the sake of conciseness, Table 5 only presents the results for our de facto measures
of nancial openness. First, our systemic impact variable is still highly signicant for Asia
and Africa but not for the Western Hemisphere economies; this corroborates the pattern
found in section 4. When it comes to nancial integration, we conrm our previous nd-
ings that Asian economies benet from integrating into world capital markets, whereas
Western Hemisphere economies are not hurt nor do they benet from nancial integration.
Previously, we had found that nancial integration did not have any e¤ect on currency
crises for African economies. However, Table 5 (specication 5:5) indicates that this vari-
able has a positive and signicant e¤ect even after controlling for systemic impact This
indicates that these "developing" economies are clearly not ready to integrate into world
capital markets. When it comes to the di¤erent types of capital ows, the patter found in
Section 4 remains the same.
We also analyze the predictive power of our model by lagging our exogenous variables.
We follow the methodology described above by including the "out-of-sample" systemic
impact variable, and by only focussing on de facto nancial integration into world capital
markets. Through Table 6 we can conrm, for all regions, that our lagged systemic impact
variable does have predictive power for currency crises. Lagged nancial integration does
not have any predictive power in relation to the probability of a currency crisis in Asia
and the Western Hemisphere. However, for African economies a one standard deviation
increase in nancial integration in the previous period (t  1) will increase the probability
of a currency crisis (in period t) by over 2%; as was found in Table 5.
The e¤ects of the di¤erent types of capital inows vary by region. For Asian economies,
a large inow of portfolio-type capital in the previous period (t  1) will reduce the prob-
ability of a currency crisis in period t. The result that medium-term capital ows can
be benecial for Asian economies still stands, since these economies will benet from the
further development of bond markets. For the Western Hemisphere economies, the results
reported in column 6:4 indicate that FDI inows help reduce the probability of a currency
crisis; while a large inow of portfolio-type capital will increase this probability one period
in the future. Similarly, African economies benet from higher and more sustained levels
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of FDI. Though not reported, for Asian economies the lagged value of trade openness is
negatively signicant (at the 10%-level) with a marginal e¤ect of 1% vis-à-vis reducing the
probability of a currency crisis "today". For Western Hemisphere economies, we also nd
that the trade openness variable is highly signicant but this time at 1%, with a marginal
e¤ect of 13:5% (excluding Canada does not change the results).
6 Robustness
Our analysis in Section 4 was regional, where the choice of pooling data is reasonable since
systemic risk is, as far as we nd, regional. Nonetheless, as a robustness check we reproduce
the same analysis as in section 4, but this time at the country level. The signicance of the
di¤erent types of capital inows still holds at the country level, but only for South Korea,
Malaysia, and Singapore, while our systemic impact variable remains highly signicant at
the country level. However, for Western Hemisphere economies we nd that our systemic
impact variable is only signicant for Argentina and Mexico. This result mirrors the
conclusions reached through Table 15, namely that linkages between crises in the Western
Hemisphere economies is in general weak. Interestingly, this is in contrast to the results
found in Section 4:2, where we found that that the systemic impact variable is signicant.
The di¤erence might due to the data pooling e¤ects.
We also conduct a second robustness check by changing the threshold level. As we
explained in Section 2:3, when we construct the CPJF we choose, according to the Hill
plot procedure, the top 13:3% order statistics, which we then use to construct our systemic
impact variable. Theoretically, multivariate extreme value theory (MEVT ) ensures that
the estimation of the CPJF is insensitive to the choice of threshold. However, this property
does not necessarily ensure a stable result for the probit model; it is thus necessary to check
the robustness by changing the threshold.
For our new threshold we choose a level of 6:7%, which is the threshold used by Eichen-
green et al. (1996) under normality assumptions ( + 1:5). Obviously, such a threshold
choice is more restrictive vis-à-vis the denition of a tail event (i.e. it leads to an un-
derestimation of risk). It is worth pointing out that by shifting the threshold level, the
dependent variable as well as our systemic impact variable also change; however, changing
the threshold does not change any of the other control variables. The results from this
last exercise point to three major di¤erences: First, our systemic impact variable is no
longer signicant for Western Hemisphere economies. This result, alongside the evidence
stemming from the individual country results, conrms the fact that pooling data for the
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Western Hemisphere bears potential estimation problems, especially since (as we have pre-
viously argued) the economies in this region of the world are tail independent in terms
of currency crises. Hence, we cannot consider the signicance of the systemic impact in
section 4:2 as robust.
Our second major di¤erence relates to nancial integration, which is now not signicant
for any of the regions in our sample. This insignicance indicates that when we consider a
more restrictive level of tail events, we can only benet from nancial integration policies
by reducing information asymmetry (i.e. by taking into account systemic impact). The
third major di¤erence relates to the e¤ects of the various types of capital ows. More
specically, if we solely relied on the 6:7% threshold results, we would conclude that African
economies could benet from all types of capital ows, since they all enter signicantly
and negatively, which of course points to a di¤erent direction as compared to the results
in Section 4. Accordingly, we can only conclude that our systemic impact variable is
insensitive to the choice of threshold. Therefore, in order to gain a better understanding
on the consequences of open capital markets in relation to the reduction of currency crises,
it is imperative to specify the risk level precisely as we have done in this paper.
7 Conclusion
This paper has contributed to the understanding of nancial openness in terms of currency
crises. Throughout the paper we have also argued that "cross-market rebalancing" is an
important source of joint crises, where the standard approach to capturing systemic impact
only considers whether at least one of the other economies in the same region is su¤ering
a crisis. Intuitively, however, countries may have di¤erent links during crises periods.
Therefore, in order to incorporate the di¤erent levels of connections between countries,
we need as a rst measure, the dependence between di¤erent economies during periods of
extreme values. Accordingly, we derived the conditional probability of joint failure (CPJF),
which is an informative measure of "tail-dependence".
By employing monthly data for 23 economies spanning di¤erent regions of the world for
the period 1978  2007, a battery of statistical and empirical tests reject, at high levels of
condence, tail-independence at the regional level. However, at the global level (i.e. joint
crises across regions), we only nd tail independence. Furthermore, the degree of within
region dependency can be ranked: African economies show the most tail-dependence, fol-
lowed by Asia. Interestingly, we nd that the Western Hemisphere economies are the most
tail-independent when it comes to the transmission of currency crisis. We then used probit
27
models to compare our newly-constructed systemic impact variable with the standard ap-
proach in the literature of treating all neighboring economies equally. Firstly, our systemic
impact variable helps to improve the t of the model. Secondly, our variable displays higher
economic signicance in evaluating the possibility of a currency crisis, particularly in re-
gions demonstrating strong or at least some tail-dependence such as in Asia and Africa.
In a more tail-independent region such as the Western Hemisphere, the e¤ect is weaker
but still signicant. Therefore, our probit estimation results conrm that the probability
of a currency crisis in a given economy increases signicantly due to the systemic impact
of crises in a region, especially in regions that are more "tail-dependent".
One of the main objectives of the paper was to nd out whether integration into world
(capital) markets increases nancial instability. By taking systemic impact into account we
observe that de facto nancial openness helps to reduce the occurrence of currency crises.
In order to clarify further the pros and cons of nancial openness, we decomposed it into
the di¤erent types of capital inows. This decomposition shows that African and Western
Hemisphere economies benet from "persistent" FDI inows; while Asia is the only region
that benets from a steady increase in portfolio-type inows. We also found that higher
exchange market pressure is associated with a stronger acceleration of CPI ination, and
expansionary scal policy. Western Hemisphere economies behave di¤erently from Asian
economies in relation to the impact of GDP growth, since Western Hemisphere economies
can reduce the probability of a currency crisis by increasing their GDP growth in a more
stable fashion. Furthermore, lack of international reserves and higher levels of CPI ination
can have quite damaging e¤ects as far as excessive pressure in their respective currencies.
For African economies we nd that lower ination, improvements in the government budget
balance, and higher levels of international reserves, benet these economies by helping
reduce the probability of a currency crisis. We also controlled for the onset of banking
crises, and our results indicate that for more tail-dependent regions such as Asia and
Africa, currency crises are mainly driven by speculative attacks rather than by the onset
of banking crises. On the other hand, for a more independent region such as the Western
Hemisphere, the onset of a banking crisis is a signicant source of currency crises. All in
all, our systemic impact variable, by accounting for information asymmetry and the level
of speculative attacks in a given region, provides a proper instrument for evaluating the
systemic impact of nancial crises.
In the introduction to this paper we asked three interrelated questions: (i) How can
we best capture the systemic linkages of crises? (ii) Is the systemic risk of currency
crisis a regional or a global phenomenon? (iii) By controlling for systemic impact, do
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other mechanisms like nancial openness increase the probability of a currency crisis? The
answers to those questions are now clear: (i) the CPJF measures the systemic linkages
between nancial crises and helps to improve our understanding of this e¤ect. Furthermore,
our systemic impact variable, which is based on the CPJF, provides a more informative
measure for the systemic impact of crises to a specic country; (ii) systemic risk does
exist, but only from (regional) neighbors; (iii) by taking into account the systemic impact
of crises, de facto nancial openness helps reduce the probability of a currency crisis.
Given these answers, several important policy implications emerge from the empirical
results presented in this article. First, once a crisis begins in a given region, the interna-
tional community should be prepared to support other economies in the region. Second,
there is a need for governments to undertake transparent monetary and scal policies in or-
der to reduce information asymmetry, especially in relation to the private sector, and help
the latter form expectations that are closer to those of the monetary and scal authorities.
Third, using a one-size-ts-all approach to capital account management is not advisable,
since the e¤ects of di¤erent types of capital vary by region. We have shown that all capital
is not created equal, and that the e¤ects vary by region. If capital controls are to be used,
they should be targeted at short-term capital, while at the same time allowing medium
to long-term capital into an economy. This approach will, at the very least, help reduce
economic imbalances. Fourth, the results indicate that countries must pursue monetary
policy aiming at "price stability" through, for example, a exible ination target that takes
into account systemic risk, in order to mitigate a currency crisis. Lastly, though countries
can prevent the onset of a currency crisis by pursuing polices that result in sound internal
and external macroeconomic balances, currency crisis can still spread to such countries;
therefore, the prevention, resolution, and management of the systemic impact of the crises
may require more thoroughly coordinated actions among the di¤erent regional economies.
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Appendix A - Country Sample and Data Description
Table 7: Regions and Countries in Sample
Region Country Region Country
Africa Burkina Faso Asia Australia
Cote dIvoire India
Mali Indonesia
Mauritius Japan
Niger Korea
Senegal Malaysia
South Africa New Zealand
Western Hemisphere Argentina Pakistan
Brazil Philippines
Canada Singapore
Mexico Thailand
Venezuela
Data Sources and Variables
 Period-average exchange rate: Local Currency Unit per US dollar (IFS line rf)
 Short-term interest rate is the money market rate (IFS line 60r) if available, otherwise
the discount rate (IFS line 60). For India we use the call money rate (IFS line60b),
supplemented with the inter-bank lending rate (IFS line60p). For New Zealand, we
supplemented with the T-bill rate (IFS line60c). For Indonesia, we use the call money
rate (IFS line60b) supplemented with the 3-month deposit rate (IFS line60l).
 Total non-gold International Reserves in US dollars (IFS line 1L.D)
 Domestic credit in national currency (IFS line 32)
 M1 in national currency (IFS line 34)
 M2 in national currency (IFS, M1 plus line 35)
 GDP in national currency (IFS line 99b)
 CPI (IFS line 64)
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 Current Account Balance (net) in national currency (IFS, line 78ALD)
 Overall Budget Balance in US dollars (IFS line 78CBD)
 Financial Assets (IFS line11) in national currency
 Financial Liabilities (IFS line16c) in national currency
 Merchandise Exports (IFS line70) & Imports (IFS line71); both in US dollars
 FDI Inows (IFS line78BED)
 Portfolio Inows (IFS line 78BGD)
 Debt Inows (IFS line 78BID)
Table 8: Construction of Variables (in millions of USA dollars)
Variables Construction
Annual growth rate of domestic credit = Di¤erence in logs from IFS line32
Government Budget as % of GDP = (IFS line 78cbd) /
(IFS line 99b/IFS line rf)
Current Account as % of GDP = (IFS line 78ald/IFS line rf) /
(IFS line 99b/IFS line rf)
Ratio M2 to international reserves = ((IFS line 34+35)/IFS line rf) /
(IFS line .1ld)
CPI Ination = Di¤erence in logs from IFS line64
Financial Openness = [(assets + liab.)/IFS line rf] /
(IFS line 99b/IFS line rf)
Trade Openness = (exports + imports) /
(IFS line 99b/IFS line rf)
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Appendix B - Descriptive Statistics
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Asian Economies
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Di¤ in Domestic Credit Growth 3810 0.005 0.04 -0.73 0.71
Di¤ in Liquidity 3810 -71.68 37.07 -213.93 54.17
Di¤ in GDP growth 3660 0.004 0.04 -0.12 0.91
Di¤ in Current Account 3626 0.27 0.47 -0.76 2.81
Di¤ Government Budget 3658 0.001 0.01 -0.07 0.05
Di¤ CPI Ination 3122 0.14 0.88 -4.50 12.82
Di¤ in Financial Integration 3609 2.05 2.51 -0.02 12.18
Di¤ in Trade Openness 3651 0.09 0.48 -0.23 2.29
FDI Inowsz 3305 0.23 0.72 -15.34 10.43
Portfolio Inowsz 3305 0.74 3.23 -25.60 40.98
Debt Inowsz 3305 0.18 3.50 -46.44 21.01
Neighborhood Dummy 3685 0.52 0.50 0 1.00
Systemic Impact 3685 0.21 0.27 0 1.95
Onset banking Crisis 3817 0.04 0.21 0 1
Moving Window Systemic Impact 1045 0.10 0.15 0 0.85
note: z = in billions of US dollars
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for West. Hemisphere Economies
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Di¤ in Domestic Credit Growth 1599 0.03 0.07 -0.23 0.82
Di¤ in Liquidity 1659 -69.18 31.31 -211.06 38.01
Di¤ in GDP growth 1473 0.02 0.20 -0.11 3.30
Di¤ in Current Account 1470 -0.38 3.27 -35.93 0.14
Di¤ Government Budget 1470 -0.008 0.44 -5.22 1.25
Di¤ in Financial Integration 1463 15.01 28.01 -1.05 429.48
Trade Openness 1469 4.58 2.98 0.06 38.52
Di¤ CPI Ination 1671 3.79 9.80 -2.19 196.39
FDI Inowsz 1503 0.70 1.11 -2.23 10.69
Portfolio Inowsz 1503 0.52 1.30 -2.99 13.28
Debt Inowsz 1503 0.10 1.37 -11.04 8.95
Neighborhood Dummy 1680 0.39 0.49 0 1
Systemic Impact 1680 0.06 0.09 0 0.48
Onset banking Crisis 1680 0.05 0.22 0 1
Moving Window Systemic Impact 480 0.03 0.06 0 0.34
note: z = in billions of US dollars
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for African Economies
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Di¤ in Domestic Credit Growth 2399 0.0008 0.05 -0.38 0.36
Di¤ in Liquidity 2264 -37.58 131.60 -211.83 1727.79
Di¤ in GDP growth 2345 0.002 0.02 -0.18 0.33
Di¤ in Current Account 2177 0.27 0.24 -0.84 0.76
Di¤ Government Budget 2177 -0.02 0.30 -2.81 2.30
Di¤ in Financial Integration 2352 1.50 0.74 0.13 3.78
Di¤ CPI Ination 2294 0.14 1.75 -17.04 15.18
FDI Inowsz 2177 0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.61
Portfolio Inowsz 2033 0.04 0.20 -0.25 1.82
Debt Inowsz 2177 0.01 0.08 -0.16 0.75
Neighborhood Dummy 2359 0.39 0.49 0 1
Systemic Impact 2359 0.20 0.37 0 1.94
Onset Banking Crisis 2408 0.03 0.18 0 1
Moving Window Systemic Impact 679 0.15 0.31 0 1.81
note: z = in billions of US dollars
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Appendix C - Conditional Probability of Joint Failure
Table 12: Correlation within Asia; 1978M1-2006M12
Aus India Indo Jap Kor Malay New Z. Pak Philip Sing Thai
Australia 1 0.13 0.15 0.40 0.19 0.27 0.25 0.13 -0.02 0.30 0.12
India 0.13 1 0.11 0.18 0.16 0.26 0.05 0.00 0.15 0.24 0.19
Indon 0.15 0.11 1 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.10 0.00 0.16 0.19 0.18
Japan 0.40 0.18 0.22 1 0.37 0.32 0.24 0.15 0.08 0.39 0.09
Korea 0.19 0.16 0.29 0.37 1 0.38 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.40 0.11
Malaysia 0.27 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.38 1 0.20 0.13 0.29 0.51 0.33
New Z. 0.25 0.05 0.10 0.24 0.13 0.20 1 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.15
Pakistan 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.05 1 0.05 0.15 -0.01
Philip -0.02 0.15 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.29 0.12 0.05 1 0.15 0.06
Singap 0.30 0.24 0.19 0.39 0.40 0.51 0.14 0.15 0.15 1 0.11
Thailand 0.12 0.19 0.18 0.09 0.11 0.33 0.15 -0.01 0.06 0.11 1
Table 13: CPJF in Asia; 1978M1-2006M12
Aus India Indo Jap Kor Malay New Z. Pak Philip Sing Thai
Australia 1 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.13 0.08 0.17 0.13
India 0.10 1 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.23 0.27
Indonesia 0.18 0.10 1 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.22 0.11 0.08 0.15 0.08
Japan 0.15 0.15 0.22 1 0.22 0.25 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.22 0.18
Korea 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.22 1 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.14
Malaysia 0.17 0.18 0.11 0.25 0.18 1 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.30 0.27
New Z. 0.20 0.11 0.22 0.15 0.10 0.17 1 0.14 0.08 0.18 0.11
Pakistan 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.14 1 0.15 0.10 0.11
Philip 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.08 0.15 1 0.15 0.10
Singap 0.17 0.23 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.30 0.18 0.10 0.15 1 0.20
Thailand 0.13 0.27 0.08 0.18 0.14 0.27 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.20 1
Bold indicates tail dependence signicant at better than 10%
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Table 14: Correlation in West. Hemisphere; 1978M1-2006M12
Argentina Brazil Canada Mexico Venezuela
Argentina 1 0.40 0.10 0.18 0.11
Brazil 0.40 1 0.11 0.08 0.05
Canada 0.10 0.11 1 0.08 0.05
Mexico 0.18 0.08 0.08 1 0.06
Venezuela 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.06 1
Table 15: CPJF in West. Hemisphere; 1978M1-2006M12
Argentina Brazil Canada Mexico Venezuela
Argentina 1 0.15 0.10 0.17 0.07
Brazil 0.15 1 0.08 0.18 0.14
Canada 0.10 0.08 1 0.11 0.08
Mexico 0.17 0.18 0.11 1 0.06
Venezuela 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.06 1
Table 16: Correlation in Africa; 1979M2-2007M9
Burkina F. Côte dIvoire Mali Maurit Niger Senegal S. Africa
Burkina Faso 1 0.73 0.92 0.35 0.08 0.09 0.01
Côte dIvoire 0.73 1 0.78 0.30 0.06 0.06 0.01
Mali 0.92 0.78 1 0.37 0.04 0.04 0.02
Mauritius 0.35 0.30 0.37 1 0.06 0.05 0.07
Niger 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.06 1 0.99 0.25
Senegal 0.09 0.61 0.04 0.05 0.99 1 0.25
South Africa 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.25 0.25 1
Table 17: CPJF in Africa; 1979M2-2007M9
Burkina F. Côte dIvoire Mali Maurit Niger Senegal S. Africa
Burkina Faso 1 0.50 0.76 0.25 0.13 0.11 0.08
Côte dIvoire 0.50 1 0.58 0.23 0.13 0.11 0.11
Mali 0.76 0.58 1 0.25 0.14 0.13 0.08
Mauritius 0.25 0.23 0.25 1 0.11 0.11 0.10
Niger 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11 1 0.91 0.20
Senegal 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.91 1 0.18
South Africa 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.20 0.18 1
Bold indicates tail dependence signicant at better than 10%
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Table 18: CPJF between Asia and Africa
Burkina F. Côte dIvoire Mali Maurit Niger Senegal S. Africa
Australia 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.13
India 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.11
Indonesia 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10
Japan 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.10
Korea 0.17 0.22 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.10
Malaysia 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.10
New. Z. 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.13
Pakistan 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.03
Philippines 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.07
Singapore 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08
Thailand 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
Bold indicates tail dependence signicant at better than 10%
Table 19: CPJF between Asia and West. Hemisphere
Argentina Brazil Canada Mexico Venezuela
Australia 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.18 0.08
India 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.07
Indonesia 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.17 0.10
Japan 0.17 0.10 0.15 0.18 0.10
Korea 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.08
Malaysia 0.10 0.13 0.22 0.17 0.08
New. Z. 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.05
Pakistan 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
Philippines 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.03
Singapore 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.13
Thailand 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.10
Bold indicates tail dependence signicant at better than 10%
Table 20: CPJF between West. Hemisphere and Africa
Burkina F. Côte dIvoire Mali Maurit Niger Senegal S. Africa
Argentina 0.10 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.20
Brazil 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10
Canada 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.06
Mexico 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.17
Venezuela 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.05
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Appendix D - Unweighted Results for WH and Africa
Table 21: Western Hemisphere Sample Panel Probit Results; 1978M1 - 2006M12
21:1 mfx 21:2 mfx 21:3 mfx 22:4 mfx 22:5 mfx
Di¤ in Liquidity 0.004 2.5 0.004 2.2 0.004 2.5 0.004 2.5 0.005 2.8
(2.35)  (1.78)  (2.16)  (2.28)  (3.97) 
Di¤ in GDP growth -0.45 -1.7 -0.69 -2.5 -0.48 -1.8 -0.45 -1.7 -0.56 -1.9
(-1.68)  (-3.62)  (-2.06)  (-1.65)  (-2.33) 
Di¤ CPI Ination 0.02 4.9 0.05 8.8 0.02 3.9 0.02 3.9 0.02 2.9
(3.65)  (8.67)  (3.90)  (3.35)  (3.94) 
Di¤ Fin. Open. -0.003 -1.7
(-2.40) 
Di¤ Trade Open. -0.02
(-0.89)
Di¤ Current Acc. 0.002 -0.9
(2.93) 
FDI inows -0.37 -7.1
(-3.01) 
Portfolio inows -0.08 -2.0
(1.66) 
Debt inows -0.06
(-1.37)
Onset Bank. Crisisz 0.56 14.1 0.53 12.9 0.55 13.8 0.57 14.3 0.43
(2.50)  (2.26)  (2.39)  (2.53)  (1.55)
Regular Neighbor 0.42 8.5 0.37 7.2 0.43 8.7 0.41 8.3 0.37 6.9
Dummyz (5.19)  (4.79)  (5.83)  (5.26)  (5.04) 
Observations 1473 1461 1467 1468 1296
McFadden R2 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.33
Notes: Dependent variable is a crisis dummy; model includes a constant; *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1%
sig. levels respectively; Robust z-statistic in parenthesis; Di¤ in liquidity = di¤ in (M2/Int. Reserves);
mfx = (marginal e¤ect*standard deviation)*100; z = mfx is based on a discrete change from 0 to 1
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Table 22: Africa Sample Panel Probit Results; 1979M2 - 2007M9
22:1 mfx 22:2 mfx 22:3 mfx 22:4 mfx 22:5 mfx
Di¤ in Dom. Credit 2.31 1.7 2.39 1.9 3.21 2.28 1.7 2.30
(1.67)  (1.65)  (0.52) (1.71)  (1.48)
Di¤ in Liquidity 0.001 2.6 0.001 2.6 0.001 3.9 0.001 2.6 0.001 2.6
(5.82)  (5.24)  (7.71)  (5.30)  (5.29) 
Di¤ in GDP growth 1.26 1.37 -1.46 1.15 1.42
(1.05) (1.21) (-0.84) (0.95) (0.95)
Di¤ in Gov. Budget -0.37 -0.35 -0.31
(-1.59) (-1.60) (-1.31)
Di¤ CPI Ination 0.04 1.2 0.04 1.2 0.14 6.1 0.04 1.1 0.05 1.4
(2.04)  (2.07)  (3.36)  (1.96)  (2.17) 
Di¤ Fin. Open -0.13 -1.6
(-3.17) 
Di¤ Trade Open. 0.009
(1.47)
Di¤ Current Acc. -0.70 -2.8
(-4.62) 
FDI inows -4.26 -4.8
(-4.30) 
Portfolio inows -0.21
(-0.32)
Debt inows 0.99
(0.47)
Onset Bank. Crisisz 0.06 0.06 1.71 60.3 0.06 -0.01
(0.23) (0.22) (25.12)  (0.23) (-0.05)
Regular Neighbor 1.25 25.1 1.25 24.9 0.76 19.4 1.21 23.9 1.23 25.0
Dummyz (5.21)  (5.24)  (4.17)  (4.96)  (5.37) 
Observations 1908 1908 449 1908 1773
McFadden R2 0.32 0.33 0.80 0.33 0.20
Notes: Dependent variable is a crisis dummy; model includes a constant; *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1%
sig. levels respectively; Robust z-statistic in parenthesis; Di¤ in liquidity = di¤ in (M2/Int. Reserves);
mfx = (marginal e¤ect*standard deviation)*100; z = mfx is based on a discrete change from 0 to 1
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